Abstract-We consider an inventory competition game between two firms. The question we address is this: If players do not know the opponent's action and opponent's utility function can they learn to play the Nash policy in a repeated game by observing their own sales? In this work it is proven that by means of Maximum A Posteriori (MAP) estimation, players can learn the Nash policy. It is proven that players' actions and beliefs do converge to the Nash equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
Assume two players are engaged in a strategic learning process in which they play a one-stage game repeatedly. In a one-stage game, at the beginning of every stage players order inventory levels by incurring ordering costs, and then a random demand occurs. If a player meets the demand she/he collects revenues. If a player has extra inventory levels at the end of the stage, she/he will incur holding costs. A proportion of any unmet demand will switch to another player. In this game the objective of every player is to make ordering decisions so as to maximize her/his own expected revenue.
We consider a scenario in which every player is informed of her/his own utility function but does not know the opponent's utility function. Each player knows both her/his own local demand distribution and the opponent's local demand distribution, but she/he cannot observe the current and past actions of the opponent. Players observe their own sales and remember their own previous sales. Players' sales contain information about the opponent's action. Each player constructs a belief about the opponent's strategy set such that includes opponent's Nash policy; i.e., player i (P i ) assumes that the opponent plays a threshold policy with a uniform distribution over [0, a j ]. A player's belief is a conditional probability density function over the opponent's strategies given the previous sales. At every stage of the repeated game, players observe their own sales and then update their beliefs about their opponent's strategy set. At every stage of the repeated game, every player has a belief about the opponent's strategy set. At every stage of the repeated game, players compute the Maximum A Posteriori (MAP) estimation of their belief and play their best response to that strategy.
The studies most related to this work are [1] - [5] . Authors in [2] , [3] , and [4] address the competitive inventory game. Various authors have argued the convergence to Nash equilibrium in games with a finite strategy set (see [5] , [6] and [7] ).
A. Notation
(.) + = max(., 0).
are non-negative-valued independent random variables, with a continuous density function. f di : Local demand's density function for P i ; i = 1, 2.
Random outcome for local demand d i at stage n. c i : Unit variable ordering cost for P i (c i > 0).
r i : Unit selling price for P i (r i > 0).
α i : Proportion of unmet demand that switches from 
B. One-Stage Game
Consider two players i ∈ {1, 2} without initial inventory levels. Each player i brings his inventory level to y i , where y i ≥ 0, by incurring the total ordering cost c i y i , where c i ≥ 0 is the variable ordering cost per unit. Then each player i receives the random demand d i from the customers for whom player i is the first choice. If the demand d j is unmet by player j, i.e., d j > y j , then a fixed proportion
Therefore, the total demand faced by player i becomes
in which (.) + = max(., 0). We will suppress the dependence ofd i on y j when there is no possibility of confusion. Subsequently, player i collects the revenues r i min{y i ,d i } and incurs the holding cost h i (y i −d i ) + where r i > 0 is the unit revenue and h i > 0 is the unit holding cost. As a result, player i's utility function is given as
where the expectation is taken with respect to (d 1 , d 2 ) and
We denote the game characterized by the utility functions given above and the strategy sets {[0, ∞)} i∈{1,2} as Γ.
C. Repeated Games
Player's utility function, given actions (y 1 , y 2 ), is
the expectation is over local demands d 1 and d 2 , in which
In repeated games, players try to maximize their own utility function given their belief about their opponent's strategy. Assume the information vectors {I n 1 , I n 2 } and beliefs
} at stage n are given. The learning process at stage n is given below: 1) Players choose optimal actions (y n 1 , y n 2 ), given their belief about the opponent's action:
2) Demands occur, and players observe their own sales:
where ξ n 1 and ξ n 2 are defined as random outcomes respectively for local demands d 1 and d 2 at stage n with density functions f d1 and f d2 .
3) Players update their information vectors:
4) Players update their beliefs about the distribution of the opponent's strategy:
. (1) The learning process at stage n + 1 is similar to stage n. In this work it will be shown that (y
is the Nash equilibrium:
II. DISCRETE LEARNING MODEL
At the first stage there is no sales history, and the information vector is given as I 1 i = g i (.) . P i supposes that P j plays a threshold policy with a uniform distribution on [0, a j ], therefore the initial belief is the continuous density function f 1 (y j |I
. To make the model discrete, for example, let step size be ∆. P i 's discrete belief about the distribution of P j 's strategy at stage n is µ
.., M i stands for the probability that P j 's strategy will be (k − 1)∆ ≤ y j < k∆, given I n i . It is noticeable that
At the first stage, players choose the optimal actions given their belief about the distribution of the opponent's strategy. Then demands occur, and players observe their own sales and update their belief about the distribution of the opponent's strategy based on Bayes's rule. At the second stage, the information vector is
, and P i 's discrete belief about opponent's action is µ
From (2) and (3),
Discrete local demands are
It is noticeable that
where A is defined as
Example 1: Consider the case r i = 4, h i = 0.6, α i = 1,
To make the model discrete, let step size be ∆ = 0.01. In figures 1 and 2, it is shown that by means of MAP estimation players' actions and beliefs converge to the Nash equilibrium (0.45, 0.79). ). Proposition 1 means that there exists an interval U ⊂ B 1 such that P 2 will not play any policy in U . 
... This means that P 2 will never play any policy in U . Proof is given in the Appendix.
It is noticeable that the set U can always be found unless
Proposition 2 means that if there exists an interval U ⊂ B 1 such that P 2 does not choose any policy in U then P 1 will eventually figure out that y ∈ U for n = N, N + 1, ..., then for any given > 0,
Proof is given in the Appendix.
Theorem: Players' actions in the demand competition game will converge to the Nash equilibrium, (y * 1 , y * 2 ), by MAP.
Proof: At the first stage, P 1 believes that P 2 will choose a policy in the interval B 1 = [b Here the worst-case is considered, in which
According to Proposition 2, for the given 0 < 1 < b
According to Proposition 2, for the given 0 < 2 < BR 1 (b
According to Proposition 2, for n ≥ n 1 , P (A n, 1 ) = 1 and P (B n, 2 ) = 1; therefore,
It is evident that b . According to Proposition 1, without loss of generality, assume
According to Proposition 2, for the given 0
According to Proposition 2, for the given 0 < 4 < BR 1 (b
Let define,
According to Proposition 2, for n ≥ n 2 , P (A n, 3 ) = 1 and P (B n, 4 ) = 1; therefore,
According to Proposition 1, without loss of generality, assume
Because b 
2 ) and because according to Proposition 2, for the given 0 < 6 < BR 1 (b
there exists an N 6 such that P (B N6, 6 ) = 1, where
It is easy to check that b 
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This work introduce a two-player competitive game in which players do not know the opponent's utility function and the opponent's action. It is shown that players can learn the Nash equilibrium by engaging in a strategic learning process in which they play a one-shot game repeatedly. Players construct a belief about their opponent's strategy set and play their best response to the Maximium A Posteriori (MAP) of their beliefs. In every stage players observe their own sales and update their beliefs about their opponent's strategy set. It is proven that players' beliefs and actions will converge to the Nash equilibrium. Future work can be done that would investigate the case in which players do not know their opponent's local demand distribution.
V. APPENDIX A. Proof of Proposition 1
According to [1] - [5] the Nash equilibrium is unique. It can be claimed that 2) and 3) cannot be satisfied simultaneously unless (b 2 , b 1 ) = (y * 1 , y * 2 ). Similarly, 1) and 4) cannot be satisfied simultaneously unless (b 2 , b 1 ) = (y * 1 , y * 2 ).
Suppose 2) and 3) are satisfied, since best response functions are nonincreasing (Proposition 1 part 2b) ; therefore,
the odd-numbered inequalities result from 2) and the evennumbered inequalities result from 3). From Proposition 1 part 4) it is evident that (5) contradicts the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium unless (b 2 , b 1 ) = (y * 1 , y * 2 ) because the initial assumption was that y *
Similarly, suppose 1) and 4) are satisfied, then
the odd-numbered inequalities result from 1) and the evennumbered inequalities result from 4). It is evident that (6) contradicts the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium unless (b 2 , b 1 ) = (y * 1 , y * 2 ), because the initial assumption was that
It is assumed, without loss of generality, that b 1 > BR 2 (b 2 ). Because the best response functions are nonincreasing (Proposition 1), it follows that
Therefore, y 
B. Proof of Proposition 3
It is easy to check that 
